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BOOK REVIEW
MOMMY HAS A BLUE WHEELCHAIR:
RECOGNIZING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES*
Michael Ashley Steint
A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE TIFFANY CALLO STORY, Jay Mathews,
New York: Henry Holt & Co. (1992). 265 pp.
A five-year-old [able-bodied child] told her paraplegic mother:
"When I grow up I want to be a mommy, and have a van and a blue
wheelchair." "Oh, you won't need that," the mother said. "But I like
blue," the child insisted.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1979, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge transferred
the custody of quadriplegic William Carney's two sons, who
had been living with him for three years, to their absentee
able-bodied mother.2 The court held that, because William was
not able to play Little League baseball with his sons or take
* © 1994 Michael Ashley Stein. All Rights Reserved.
t Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, New York University Law School;
Adjunct Professor of English, New York University; President, National Disabled
Bar Association, 1992-94. Heartfelt thanks to Barbara Dildine, Chava Willig Levy,
Martha Minow, Kenneth Rabb, Carol Sanger and Jonathan Weiss for commenting
on earlier drafts, and to Tami Lefko for her assistance and encouragement. This
paper was presented on March 29, 1994, to the New York University Law School
faculty; I am grateful for their comments. I also am indebted to Dean John Sexton
for his generous support.
I JAY MATHEWS, A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE TIFFANY CALLO STORY at vii (1992)
(quoting psychologist Megan Kirshbaum).
2 In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. 1979).
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them fishing, William's custody "wouldn't be a normal relation-
ship between father and boys," and therefore "it would be det-
rimental for the boys to grow up until age 18 in the custody of
their father."' The California Supreme Court reversed the
superior court on the ground that the decision "was affected by
serious misconceptions as to the importance of the involvement
of parents in the purely physical aspects of their children's
lives."4 Those "serious misconceptions," the supreme court rea-
soned, had led the superior court to "stereotype[ ] William as a
person deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply be-
cause he is physically handicapped."5
Less than a decade after the Carney decision, the Santa
Clara County Department of Social Services removed David
and Jesse Callo from the custody of their disabled6 mother,
' Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted).
4 Id.
Id. at 42.
' The term "disabled" and phrase "individuals with disabilities," as used in
this Book Review, refer only to individuals with a motor- or sensory-related im-
pairment and specifically do not relate to individuals who are developmentally dis-
abled. For analysis of the familial and procreative rights .of the developmentally
disabled, which raise different legal and social issues than those of individuals
with physical disabilities, see generally SARAH F. HAAVIK & KARL A. MENNINGER
II, SEXUALITY, LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON: LEGAL AND
CLINICAL ASPECTS OF MARRIAGE, PARENTHOOD AND STERILIZATION (1981); Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr. & Marcia P. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead: Buck v.
Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 995 (1977);
Martha A. Field, Honest Differences in Discerning the Constitution's Meaning-The
Task of Defining Constitutional Rights for Persons Who Are Retarded, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 1301 (1987); Robert L. Hayman Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics,
and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1990).
In addition, the term "disabled" and phrase "individuals with disabilities" will
not always include people who have been tested positive for the Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus ("HIV"). The reason for this semi-inclusion bears noting. Following
the inclusive interpretation by courts of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("No otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall, by reason of her or his dis-
ability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving a Federal
financial assistance . . . ."), the Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA") committee
reports explicitly recognized HIV-positivity as a disability. See H.R. REP. NO. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333;
H.R. REP. NO. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S. REP. NO. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989); see also
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
HIV-positive teacher transferred to an administrative job had strong possibility of
success on the merits under the Rehabilitation Act); Local 1812, American Fed'n of
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Tiffany Callo. Callo's struggle to regain custody of her children
is recounted in journalist Jay Mathews's' sensitive and en-
grossing book, A Mother's Touch: The Tiffany Callo Story.8
I. MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS
In 1980, Professor Robert Burgdorf,9 a prominent dis-
abled, disability rights advocate, wrote that mainstream
society's historical treatment of individuals with disabilities
"can be summed up in two words: segregation and inequali-
ty." °' Studies on the status of disabled Americans conducted
Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987)
(finding that MIV-positive foreign service employees were likely to prevail in their
suit under the Rehabilitation Act). This recognition is especially laudable-and
unfortunately necessary as well-because of continuing prejudice against HIV-in-
fected people, particularly when they also are gay.
The issues raised in custodial disputes involving HIV-positive parents are not
always the same as those involving parents with other physical disabilities. Both
groups, however, must rebut misconceptions about the "abnormality" of their
parenting relationships, and debilitated HIV-infected parents may be questioned
about their ability to physically care for their children. See, e.g., Jane W. v. John
W., 137 Misc. 2d 24, 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987). Similarly,
the parental rights of HIV-positive people are most often challenged on the basis
of either alleged shortened life expectancy or risk of transmission. See, e.g., Steven
L. v. Dawn J., 148 Misc. 2d 779, 561 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Farn. Ct. Kings County 1990);
Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988). The
custodial concerns of HIV-infected parents are addressed in a number of fine arti-
cles. See generally Nancy B. Mahon, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custo-
dy and Visitation Disputes Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1092 (1988); Carol Sanger, M Is for Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 15 (1992).
" Mathews is a correspondent for Newsweek and a former Los Angeles Bureau
Chief of the Washington Post. Mathews's previous publications include Escalante:
The Best Teacher in America, published in 1988, which formed the basis for the
film Lean on Me.
MATHEWS, supra note 1.
Professor Burgdorf was one of the central authors and proponents of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. IV 1992)
[hereinafter ADA]. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 106-16 (1993). For Burgdorf's own anal-
ysis of the ADA, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991).
10 ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND TExT 51 (1980). Many studies have been conducted of the
historical treatment of disabled people. See, e.g., DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-
CLASS CITIZENS (Myron G. Eisenberg et al. eds., 1982); JOHN B. FRIEDMAN, THE
MONSTROUS RACES IN MEDIEVAL ART AND THOUGHT (1981); ELIOT FRIEDSON, DIS-
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by non-disability-related (and thus presumably more objective)
organizations have confirmed Professor Burgdorf's analysis.
For example, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
echoed Professor Burgdorf's statement, finding that
"[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
handicapped people."" Congress used almost identical lan-
guage in its legislative findings and purposes for the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
12
ABILITY AS SOCIAL DEVIANCE IN SOCIOLOGY AND REHABILITATION (Martin B.
Sussman ed., 1965); FREDERICK WATSON, CIVILIZATION AND THE CRIPPLE (1930);
Nettie Bartel & Samuel Guskin, A Handicap as a Social Phenomenon, in PSY-
CHOLOGY OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN AND YOUTH 75 (William M. Cruickshank ed.,
4th ed. 1971); Gustav F. Schultz, The Cripple in Primitive Society, 8 AM. J. CARE
FOR CRIPPLES 335 (1920). The sensitivity of these studies generally corresponds
with the nomenclature used to describe their subjects.
" UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPEC-
TRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 159 (1983). Graphic examples of how severely peo-
ple with physical disabilities are segregated from mainstream society were provid-
ed by the findings of an independent nationwide poll of disabled Americans con-
ducted in 1986 by Louis Harris and Associates ("Harris Poll"). INTERNATIONAL CTR.
FOR THE DISABLED, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED
AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986). The survey found that two-thirds of all
working-age people with disabilities are unemployed. Id. at 47. In addition, the
survey found that during the one-year period prior to the poll, nearly two-thirds of
the disabled did not attend movies, three-fourths did not see live theater or music
performances, two-thirds of disabled people did not attend sporting events, 17%
did not eat in restaurants, and 13% did not shop in grocery stores. Id. at 37-40;
see also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 5 (1986)
(more than 20% of working-age individuals with disabilities are below the poverty
level). The results of the Harris Poll are cited often by disability rights groups.
See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY OF
THE 1986 HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (1988); NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988). The
results of the Harris Poll were cited also by Congress during hearings on the
ADA- See Guaranteed Job Opportunity Act: Joint Hearing on S. 777 Before the
Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor), quoted in S. REP. No. 116, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989) & H.R. REP. NO. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 31
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313; see also H.R. REP. NO. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 447.
12 "[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). It was perhaps for these
reasons that Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.) described the legislation's en-
actment as "an emancipation proclamation" for disabled Americans. 135 CONG.
REC. S10,789 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989); see also Nathaniel C. Nash, Bush and Sen-
ate Leaders Support Sweeping Protection for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at
Al (quoting, Ralph G. Neas, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, who labeled the legislation as "the most comprehensive civil rights
1072 [Vol. 60: 1069
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Underlying and reinforcing the segregation of people with
disabilities are a series of myths arising from misconceptions
about the disabled.13 The most ubiquitous of those myths (and
one that I have discussed at length elsewhere'4 ) casts physi-
cally disabled people in alternative, albeit dichotomous roles:
as pitiable poster children or inspirational "supercrips." The
paradigmatic poster child is, of course, any one of the children
paraded on television during the annual Labor Day Muscular
Dystrophy Telethon. A model "supercrip" is paraplegic park
ranger Mark Wellman, who climbed a granite peak in Yosemi-
te National Park. Because the burden of achieving
"supercrip" status is beyond the power of most people-let
alone those with physical impairments-the result of this dual
mythology has been to associate physically disabled people
with pity.
16
Another particularly pervasive myth about physically
disabled people is that they either are sexually unwilling or
unable (the "disabled non-sexuality myth"). Nationally syn-
measure in the past two and a half decades").
13 Psychologist Carol Gill has correctly noted society's emphasis on "the needs
and interests of men with disabilities to the virtual neglect of women." Carol Gill,
Getting Ready: Six Trends That Will Challenge People with Disabilities Through
1994-And Beyond, MAINSTREAM: MAG. OF THE ABLE-DISABLED, Dec. 1993/Jan.
1994, at 27, 28. Accordingly, this Book Review will attempt to address the needs
and concerns raised by women with disabilities. See generally Jo CAMPLING, IMAG-
ES OF OURSELVES: WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES TALKING (1981); ANN C. CARRILLO ET
AL., No MORE STARES (1982); WITH THE POWER OF EACH BREATH: A DISABLED
WOMEN'S ANTHOLOGY (Susan E. Browne et al. eds., 1985); WITH WINGS: AN AN-
THOLOGY OF LITERATURE BY AND ABOUT WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES (Marsha Sax-
ton & Florence Howe eds., 1987); WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLO-
GY, CULTURE AND POLITICS (Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988).
14 Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of
Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245, 249-51 (1994).
" See id. at 250.
11 A survey of non-disabled people on their feelings toward individuals with
disabilities indicates that some 74% of non-disabled Americans feel pity for the
disabled. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES INC., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES 13 (1991) thereinafter PUBLIC ATTITUDES]. The result is what
disability rights advocate and ADA proponent Justin Dart, Jr. terms a "subhuman
perception" of the disabled. See SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 109.
17 LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 184
(1984) (noting "a sociological/psychological obstacle regarding human sexuality and
special problems of physically handicapped persons involving sexual relationships");
see also Cricket Potash, Sex: Pure and Not So Simple, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE,




dicated columnist Diane Piastro, whose feature, "Living With a
Disability," receives several dozen letters a year with questions
about disabled sexuality from non-disabled people, writes that
"'[o]ne of the most common misconceptions about people with
disabilities is that they can't have sex, don't want sex or are
not interested in sex. People seem to think a disability neuters
you sexually."1
8
Mainstream society's discomfort with the notion of dis-
abled people's relational intimacy is well documented. For
example, the Louis Harris Public Attitudes Poll found that
forty-six percent of able-bodied people stated they "would be
concerned" if their teenage son or daughter dated a disabled
person, and thirty-four percent "would be concerned" if a friend
or relative married a person with a disability.19 Mainstream
discomfort has also been discussed in personal accounts of both
disabled and non-disabled women. Photographer Angelina
Hekking, who has multiple sclerosis, notes that she returned
to Holland during the fifth month of her pregnancy to "be
treated as a normal pregnant woman," because she felt that in
the United States she "was treated as a diseased person."
20
During the courtship of able-bodied writer Erica Levy Klein
and her disabled husband-to-be Ken Kroll,2' Klein's friends
and family advised her to "stay away from damaged goods" and
not to "put a healthy body in a sick bed."22 Klein slowly lost
patience. Finally, when she was told 'You can't be serious,
Erica! What if his condition gets worse and he turns into a
18 KEN KROLL & ERICA L. KLEIN, ENABLING ROMANCE: A GUIDE TO LOVE, SEX,
AND RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE DISABLED (AND THE PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT THEM)
16 (1992) (quoting Diane Piastro) (emphasis omitted).
1' PUBLIC ATTITUDES, supra note 16, at 15. Last year I received quite a few
mortified looks from a non-disabled audience -when, in response to the question
"What's your take on disabled sexuality?," I replied "Overwhelmingly in favor and
as frequently as possible!"
20 Angelina M.A. Hekking, Seeds of Light: Images of Healing, KALEIDOSCOPE:
INVL MAG. LITERATURE, FINE ARTS & DISABILITY, Summer/Fall 1993, at 19, 21.
21 Kroll and Klein are the authors of an exceptionally good book on disabled
sexuality. See KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18. The only shortfall of this book is
that although it is comprehensive in scope-addressing disabled/non-disabled and
disabled/disabled sexuality, self-loving, adaptive aides and innovative tech-
niques-no same-sex or cross-ethnic couples responded to Kroll and Klein's ques-
tionnaire. Their absence detracts from the inclusive focus of this otherwise out-
standing book.
I KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 12.
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vegetable?," Klein "replied through clenched teeth: 'Then I'll
just have to throw some butter and garlic on him and saut6
him.' ,23
The main consequences of the disabled non-sexuality myth
are (1) difficulty in the formation of intimate interpersonal
relationships between disabled and non-disabled people; (2)
limited awareness and availability of health care services to
women with disabilities; and (3) as a corollary to the myth,
severe misperceptions about and often prejudices against indi-
viduals with disabilities acting in parental or guardianship ca-
pacities.
First, the disabled non-sexuality myth and its attendant
discomfort lead to a strong reluctance among the able-bodied to
acknowledge or enter into romantic relationships with the
disabled.' The painful effects of mainstream aversion were
made poignantly obvious by many of the individuals featured
in Ken Kroll and Erica Levy Klein's book Enabling Romance: A
Guide to Love, Sex and Relationships for the Disabled.25
Marilyn, a woman who had had polio, told Kroll and Klein
that:
Right after becoming disabled, I discovered that... men[ ] reacted
KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 13.
2, This attitude formed one of the tenets of the eugenics movement, started in
the late nineteenth century, which, among other things, fought to prevent inter-
marriage between disabled and "normal" people on the theory that disabled
people's "defects" were hereditary. See JOHN V. VAN CLEVE & BARRY A. CROUCH,
A PLACE OF THEIR OWN: CREATING THE DEAF COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 148-50
(1989). One leading expert on disabled sexuality has argued that "[t]he 'politics of
eugenics' is the underpinning of social policy restricting disabled people's freedom
of intimate association.... Eugenics has as its assumption that the child born to
a disabled mother will inevitably be defective, not only in its physical characteris-
tics, but as a social, emotional and moral being." The Testimony: The Politics of
Eugenics, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 6 (testimony of Barbara
Faye Waxman); see also HIRAM P. ARMS, THE INTERMARRIAGE OF THE DEAF: ITS
MENTAL, MORAL, AND SOCIAL TENDENCIES (1887) (advocating against deaf/hearing
marriages), cited in Edward A. Fay, Notices of Publications, 32 AM. ANNALS DEAF
250-51 (1887). In fact, a 1922 proposed Model Eugenic Sterilization Law advanced
sterilizing, among others, the following "categories" of people: "(4) Epileptic; ...
(6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitics, the leprous, and others
with chronic, infectious and legally segregable diseases); (7) Blind (including those
with seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf (including those with seriously impaired
hearing); (9) Deformed (including the crippled)." Burgdorf, Jr. & Burgdorf, supra
note 6, at 1000 n.41 (quoting HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERmIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 466-77 (1922)).
' KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18.
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differently to me in many ways. There's a lot of avoidance, "shutting
me out" of things, seeing me and quickly looking the other way,
which never gives me the chance to establish eye contact, smile, or
begin to speak.
Not long after becoming disabled, I became aware that most
people assume I no longer have feeling in my legs (I do), am not able
to have sex (I can), cannot have an orgasm (I can), and that I cannot
have sexual relationships.
My sexuality is a part of me. Disability doesn't change it at
all.
26
Similarly, Anne, who became a paraplegic as the result of a
skiing accident, reported to Kroll and Klein that:
Right after my accident, I asked my doctor if I could still have sex
and get pregnant. Those issues were very important to me and to
my self-esteem. His reply was something like "No need to worry
yourself about those things," which I then interpreted to mean that,
since I was disabled, I might as well forget about sex, romance, or
anything like that. I became incredibly depressed and felt like my
life was over.... Disabled people need to have it reaffirmed to them
that they can still function sexually and still be complete human
beings.
27
The experiences of the women interviewed by Kroll and
Klein are corroborated by other women with disabilities, most
notably those featured in- Harilyn Rousso's Disabled, Female,
and Proud!: Stories of Ten Women With Disabilities." Rousso,
a psychotherapist and disability rights activist with cerebral
palsy, contributes the following personal account:
When I was growing up, my parents and I accepted [the non-sexual-
ity] myth without question. We simply assumed that because I had a
disability, I could not date, find a partner, or have children. As a
teenager and young adult, I put aside any hope of a social life and
concentrated on my studies. It never occurred to me that I had any
alternative, that I could have both a career and a romantic life. 9
26 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 94.
27 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 19.
21 See HARILYN ROusSO, DISABLED, FEMALE, AND PROUD!: STORIES OF TEN
WOMEN wrrH DISABILITIES (1993). "I am absolutely written off by people at par-
ties, on the street. I'm looked past, ignored." Id. at 27 (quoting Adrienne Asch,
blind civil rights investigator).
2 Id. at 2. "My father and mother didn't expect much from me. They didn't
expect me to go to school and get a job or get married and have children." Id. at
101 (quoting Alice Crespo, blind court interpreter). Kroll and Klein correctly note,
1076 [Vol. 60: 1069
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In addition to these real-life stories, the discomfort with
the notion of relational intimacy with disabled people also is
reflected in popular literature.0 One illustration is offered by
the interaction between Leopold Bloom and Gertie McDowell
in James Joyce's Ulysses. While sitting on the beach, McDowell
spots Bloom eyeing her. Aware of his gaze, and hoping that he
can overlook her physical shortcomings, she flirts erotically
with him. McDowell leans back slowly, drawing her skirt and
petticoats farther up her legs as Bloom fantasizes about her.
Bloom later discovers that McDowell has a disability-she
walks with a limp. For Bloom, McDowell's disability negates
her beauty and charm. He tells a friend rather chauvinistically
"[tihe defect is ten times worse in a woman.... Glad I didn't
know it when she was on show."3 '
An even more graphic example of such prejudice appears
in Charlton Ogburn's Winespring Mountain. Wick Carter ad-
mires Letty at a distance and often thinks of her, until he dis-
covers that she is visually impaired. Carter is then:
overwhelmed with embarrassment and with pity, repelled, fright-
ened. From that moment he had been unable to think of the emo-
tions he had nursed about her without an intense desire to hide
from himself. He had been duped, not by her, of course-though
deep inside he held it against her that, disqualified as she was, she
had stirred such thoughts in him-but by fate. He had been made a
fool of32
"[n]owhere is rejection by the non-disabled society more evident than in attitudes
about the sexuality of the disabled, and, naturally, these negative feelings have a
profound effect on quality of life." KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 36; see also
William G. Stothers, The Smile: It Reminds Us That We Are Outcasts And Tells
Us to Keep Our Distance, MAINSTREAM: MAG. OF THE ABLE-DISABLED, Dec.
1993/Jan. 1994, at 62 ("Millions of people with disabilities are convinced their dis-
ability is their problem, if not their fault.").
" The emphasis on popular culture is not overstated. The Louis Harris Public
Attitudes Poll found that popular culture was a "critical link" to mainstream un-
derstanding of disabled individuals. See PUBLIC AT1TrUDES POLL, supra note 16, at
3-4. Some of the best discussions on this topic are collected in a single volume of
essays on the popular imagery associated with the disabled. See generally Deborah
Kent, Disabled Women: Portraits in Fiction and Drama, in IMAGES OF THE DIS-
ABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 47 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) [hereinafter
DISABLING IMAGES]; Leonard Kriegel, The Cripple in Literature, in DISABLING IMAG-
ES, supra, at 31; Paul K. Longmore, Screening Stereotypes: Images of Disabled
People in Television and Motion Pictures, in DISABLING IMAGES, supra, at 65.
31 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 368 (Vintage Infl 1990) (1934).
32 CHARLTON OGBURN, WINESPRING MOUNTAIN 49 (1973).
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When Letty regains her sight, Carter resumes his previous
amorous thoughts, this time without guilt.
33
Women with disabilities have attempted to address the
difficult social-integration effect of the disabled non-sexuality
myth in different ways. 4 In one highly publicized effort, Play-
boy Magazine published nude photographs of quadriplegic
Ellen Stohl in its July 1987 issue. Stohl explained that her
reason for posing was that, although she "realized [she] was
still a woman[,] . .. the world didn't accept [her] as that."" In
her letter to Playboy's publisher, Stohi asked, "Please don't
treat me as an asexual object; treat me as a sexual object!"36
The benefits enured from publication of Stohl's pictorial
were hotly debated among members of the disabled communi-
ty. The Disability Rag ReSource, a progressive disability advo-
cacy magazine, ran three consecutive issues of articles and
letters about Stohl's actions, many alluding to the irony of
Playboy's "breakthrough."37 Almost certainly, Playboy itself
was not trying to be progressive. Playboy's associate-editor,
Kate Nolan, downplayed Stohl's pictorial, explaining that Stohl
was featured only because she "looks exactly like everybody
else. We're still saying, if you don't look like everybody else
s See id. at 173-79.
" Conceptions about disabled men were most challenged by the protagonists of
the films Coming Home, Born on the Fourth of July, and The Waterdance, all of
whom were paraplegics assertive about, and capable in, sexual roles.
"5 Judith Cummings, Disabled Model Defies Sexual Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1987, at C12.
'6 CHAVA WILLIG LEVY, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT LIVING
MOVEMENT 32 (1988). The point was made with more panache (and clothes) by
visually impaired entertainer Ray Charles at a July 1993 concert. Following his
introduction of his back-up singers as the "beautiful Raylettes" a curious buzz
went out of the audience, as if Charles's impaired vision begged the question of
how he knew his assistants were "beautiful." Concert held at Radio City Music
Hall, New York, N.Y. (July 31, 1993). After a dramatic pause, the singer growled
into his microphone "Hell, I may be blind, but I ain't dead!" Id. Quadriplegic car-
toonist John Callahan debunks the disabled non-sexuality myth in a cartoon cap-
tioned "Handicapped people don't have sex." The drawing shows a man in a
wheelchair being escorted to the hospital exit by four noticeably- pregnant nurses.
JOHN CALLAHAN, DON'T WORRY, HE WON'T GET FAR ON FOOT 197 (1989). An en-
tire volume of Callahan cartoons on this subject recently was published. See JOHN
CALLAHAN, THE NIGHT, THEY SAY, WAS MADE FOR LOVE PLUS MY SEXUAL SCRAP-
BOOK (1994).
3 See WILLIG LEVY, supra note 36, at 32.
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we're not putting you in the magazine."" In other words,
Stohl's photographs appeared only because she didn't "look
disabled." On the other hand, as disability rights advocate
Chava Willig Levy quipped, "[1]ooking on the bright side, one
could conclude that Ms. Stohl's feature shattered the myth that
disability and [unattractiveness] must go hand-in-hand. 89
Besides Stohl's photographs, the disabled non-sexuality
myth has been countered in the disabled community by the
publication of many books and pamphlets on disabled sexuali-
ty4" and by the formation of educational and advocacy net-
works that address related concerns raised by people with
disabilities.4'
In addition to making intimate interpersonal relationships
difficult for disabled persons, another harmful result of the dis-
abled non-sexuality myth is that women with disabilities often
are without benefit of adequate and physically accessible
health care services. The prevailing presumption is that if
women with disabilities will not or cannot engage in sexual ac-
tivity, then they do not need access to gynecological health
care. Disabled writer and civil rights activist Cricket Potash
often finds that during her annual OB/GYN examination "the
people taking me to the examining room or taking information
See Cummings, supra note 35, at C12.
29 See WILLIG LEVY, supra note 36, at 32. I agree with Levy. Regardless of
what is thought of Playboy's moral virtues (or lack thereof), the magazine's sub-
jects generally are considered attractive by mainstream society.
"0 See, e.g., HELPING THE SEXUALLY OPPRESSED (Harvey L. & Jean Gochros et
al. eds., 1986); K. HESLINGA, NOT MADE OF STONE: THE SEXUAL PROBLEMS OF
HANDICAPPED PEOPLE (1974); THOMAS 0. MOONEY ET AL., SEXUAL OPTIONS FOR
PARAPLEGICS AND QUADRIPLEGICS (1975); PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY (Mark
Nagler ed., 1990); REPRODUCTIVE ISSUES FOR PERSONS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES
(Florence P. Haseltine et al. eds, 1993); JUDITH ROGERS & MOLLEEN MATSUMARA,
MOTHER To BE: A GUIDE TO PREGNANCY AND BIRTH FOR WOMEN WITH DISABILI-
TIES (1991); SEXUALITY AND PHYSICAL DISABLITY: "PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES (David
H. Bullard & Susan E. Knight eds., 1981); TASK FORCE ON CONCERNS OF PHYSI-
CALLY DISABLED WOMEN, TOWARD INTIMACY: FAMILY PLANNING AND SEXUALITY
CONCERNS OF PHYSICALLY DISABLED WOMEN (2d ed. 1978). Disability rights publi-
cations often devote entire issues to the subject. See, e.g., MOUTH: THE VOICE OF
DISABILITY RIGHTS, May/June 1994 (issue devoted to "The Trouble With Sex"). In
addition, several mail order catalogues offer sexual/erotic aides with special adap-
tations for individuals with disabilities.
" Examples include: Coalition on Sexuality and Disability; Sexuality and Dis-
ability Training Center; University of Michigan Sex and Disability Unit; Handicap
Introductions; PEOPLENET; The Disability Rag ReSource; Independent Living and
Health Care Today; and, Mainstream: Magazine of the Able-Disabled.
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seem surprised to see me there.... The questions on their
faces are loud, though they never say a word."42 Dr. Carol
Gill, a member of the board of a women's health center, regu-
larly has difficulty obtaining OB/GYN care at the offices of her
regular health care provider and is instead referred to a near-
by rehabilitation hospital. Gill sums up the irony of her situ-
ation: "I can't be just a woman who needs a pelvic exam; I
must be a trail-blazer."
43
In the past few years, several projects sponsored and driv-
en by women with disabilities have arisen to address the
dearth of health care in the United States for women with dis-
abilities." Among the current efforts under way, Women With
Disabilities United is identifying physically accessible women's
health service providers. Independent Living Research Utiliza-
tion is in the midst of a three-year National Institutes of
Health ("NIH")-sponsored study into the psychosocial effect of
physical disability on the capability of women with disabilities
entering into intimate emotional and physical relationships.
The NIH also sponsored a conference on "Reproductive Issues
for Persons with Physical Disabilities."45 Other projects in-
clude The California Women's Law Center's conference on
'"Women's Rights: Disabled & Deaf Women in California." Sub-
jects covered included domestic and sexual violence, family law
and family issues, and reproductive rights and reproductive
health issues, with panelists from Access Living, Disabled
Women's Network, the Domestic Violence Project and Planned
Parenthood.46
Finally, and most closely related to Callo's experiences, as
42 See Potash, supra note 17, at 30.
See Carol J. Gill, When Is a Woman Not a Woman, DISABILITY RAG RE-
SOURCE, May/June 1993, at 26.
" Women with disabilities also have begun to organize abroad. One example is
DAWN-Dis-Abled Women's Network of Canada.
"' See Barbara F. Waxman, The Year of the Disabled Woman, or Girls, It's
Time to Flaunt Your Sexuality, DISABILrrY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 28;
see also Gill, supra note 13, at 28-30.
"' My thanks to Professor Carol Sanger for providing me with this information.
In January 1993, a watermark was reached with the publication of the first edi-
tion of Disability, Pregnancy & Parenthood International. The periodical's stated
goal is "'to build a strong and lasting bridge across the gulf of ignorance that still
exists about people with disabilities becoming or remaining parents.'" See New Pe-
riodical Focuses on Parenting with a Disability, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE,
May/June 1993, at 35.
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a corollary to the disabled non-sexuality myth, severe
misperceptions and prejudices abound regarding the capacity
of individuals with disabilities to act in a parental or guardian-
ship capacity. The most striking-and perhaps infa-
mous-example of how the disabled non-sexuality myth has
created ignorance and prejudice towards disabled people in
their capacities as primary caretakers of children was a deci-
sion rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court in In re Mar-
riage of Carney.4
In December 1968, William and Ellen Carney were mar-
ried in New York.48 After four years and two boys, they sepa-
rated. By written agreement, Ellen relinquished custody of the
children to William who, because of employment reasons,
moved with the boys to California. Soon thereafter, William be-
gan living with a woman named Lori Rivera who acted as
stepmother to the Carney boys. The following year William and
Lori had a daughter, and Lori proceeded to raise all three of
the children as her own.
In August 1976, while serving as a military reservist,
William was injured in a jeep accident that left him a quadri-
plegic, with severely limited use of both his arms and legs. He
spent the following year rehabilitating in a hospital, during
which time his children visited him several times each week.
In addition, William came home almost every weekend in a
van that he had purchased and fitted with special hand con-
trols that allowed him to drive.
In May 1977, William filed an action for the official disso-
lution of his marriage from Ellen. In response, Ellen moved for
an order awarding her custody of their sons. At trial, expert
and personal testimony was presented on the solid and loving
relationship that William had with his sons.4 9 It also was un-
disputed that Ellen had not visited her sons or contributed in
' See Carney v. Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979). The Carney case has been
featured three times on the television journalism show "20/20." See Dave Matheis,
A Look Back at the Carney Decision, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993,
at 12, 14. Carney also is one of the very few cases involving individuals with
disabilities to appear in domestic relations casebooks. See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FANILY LAw 531 (3d ed. 1992).
" The following recitation of facts is taken from the opinion of the California
Supreme Court. See Carney, 598 P.2d at 37.
" For example, an expert psychiatrist testified that William had a "great"
relationship with the boys. Id. at 41.
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any way to their support during the five-year separation. 0
Nevertheless, the superior court ordered that the boys be im-
mediately transferred to their mother's custody in New York,
and that William pay child support.5' Moreover, the court or-
dered William to pay Ellen's attorney's fees and court costs in
addition to her travel and hotel expenses.52
In transferring custody, the court based its ruling almost
exclusively upon William's physical disability and its presumed
adverse effect on his capacity to be a good father." With few
exceptions, the questions voiced by the trial judge revolved
around William's physical disability and its consequences, real
or imaginary. For example, at the end of William's lengthy
testimony about his present family life and his future plans,
the trial judge asked him questions such as where William sat
"when he got out of his wheelchair, whether he had completely
lost the use of his arms, and what his medical prognosis
was."54 The trial court reasoned that, because of William's
physical disability, he could not "do anything for the boys him-
self except maybe talk to them and teach them, be a tutor,
which is good, but it's not enough."55 After all, the judge rea-
soned, wouldn't it be better if the boys had a parent who could
"take them places, play Little League baseball, go fishing?"
56
Because William could not, the court transferred custody of the
boys from William to Ellen, stating that William's custody
"wouldn't be a normal relationship between father and
boys. 57
Although the superior court's decision was reversed by a
sensitive and insightful opinion by the California Supreme
Court,58 it cannot, unfortunately, be viewed as an aberration.
Instead, the lower court's opinion in Carney demonstrates a
stereotypical viewpoint that Professor Laura Rothstein has
noted, leads to "a judicial presumption of unfitness in many
'0 Id. at 37.
" 598 P.2d at 37 n.2.
52 Id.
13 Id. at 39-40.
14 Id. at 40.
11 Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted).
' 598 P.2d at 40.
, Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted).
598 P.2d at 45; see infra text accompanying note 72.
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cases involving child custody for handicapped parents."59
Professor Rothstein observes that this "judicial presumption of
unfitness" often manifests itself in different guises for different
types of disabilities:0 deaf parents are thought to be incapa-
ble of effectively stimulating language skills;6' blind parents
cannot provide adequate attention or discipline;62 and parents
with spinal cord injuries cannot adequately supervise their
children. 3
A common theme permeating those cases evincing a ste-
reotypical approach is that the courts perceive a parental rela-
tionship involving a disabled individual to be less than normal.
For example, in In re Adoption of Richardson,' a deaf-mute
couple who had previously raised hearing children were denied
"' ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 185. But see Carney, 598 P.2d at 42 ("if a
person has a physical handicap it is impermissible for the court simply to rely on
that condition as prima facie evidence of the person's unfitness as a parent or of
probable detriment to the child"); In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742, 743 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981) ("the removal of a child from the legal custody of a parent who suffers from
a handicap cannot be presumed to be in the best interests of the child based on
the fact of the handicap alone"); Id. at 744 ("the court must evaluate a handi-
capped parent's actual and potential physical capabilities"); Michigan Dep't of So-
cial Servs. v. McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) ("Parental rights
may not be terminated on the basis of a parent's physical incapacity in the ab-
sence of culpable neglect."), superseded by, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b(3)(d)
(1988), as stated in, In re Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Mich. 1989).
In another context, Professor Martha Field has keenly observed that the rea-
son for judges' prejudice, even while acting totally in good faith, is that "judges
will often project onto the [child] their own fear of handicap." See Martha A. Field,
Killing 'the Handicapped--Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 88
(1993). A large part of the advocacy that I have performed on behalf of individuals
with disabilities has raised the issue of prejudice among members of the legal
profession. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Attitudinal Barriers to Hiring Attor-
neys with Disabilities, 17 PHYSICAL & MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 214 (1993); Mi-
chael Ashley Stein, When Justice Is Blind- Appointing Vision-Impaired Individuals
to the Bench, 1 MINORITY L.J. 5 (1992).
6o ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 185.
61 See, e.g., Christensen v. Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 327-28 (1967).
62 See, e.g., In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742, 743 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (although the
court found that there was adequate evidence to estimate that the physical and
psychological manifestation of her disease contributed to an injurious environment
for the children, the court also based its decision to place the children in the
Department of Social Services' custody on evidence of physical abuse); In re
Kurzawa, 290 N.W.2d 431 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
' See, e.g., Carney, 598 P.2d at 39-41; see also supra text accompanying notes
53-57.
- 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1967).
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the right to adopt based on their disabilities. After admitting
positive evidence on the integrity of the household, the judge
posited:
Is this a normally happy home? There is no question about it, it is a
happy home, but is it a normal home? I don't think the Court could
make a finding that it is a normal home when these poor unfortu-
nate people, they are handicapped, and what can they do in the way
of bringing this child up to be the type of citizen we all want him to
be.'
The judge then wrote a letter to the county adoption bureau,
admonishing them that "this adoption should be nipped in the
bud before these unfortunate people get too attached to the
child, as in my opinion, we are not doing right by the young-
ster in signing and approving an adoption to deaf-mutes."66
Similar reasoning was used in In re Marriage of Levin.67
In Levin, the lower court awarded custody of a former couple's
children to the father based upon the mother's use of a wheel-
chair following a stroke. The court reasoned that:
Even though we know that children of the poor do as well as chil-
dren of the rich, maybe better, still a judge can't say to a child, 'You
be poor.' I can't do that.... because of the limitations that the
handicap imposes upon what I conceive to be the most, normal,
possible life for a child."
Perhaps what is most striking about the lower court deci-
sions in Carney, Richardson and Levin is their fundamental
misunderstanding of the role of a parent as one that involves
purely physically related skills. On the contrary, among the
most essential elements of parenting are nurturing, loving,
teaching, bonding, giving attention, guiding, communicating
and transferring values. As disabled mother Melissa Walstead
notes, "Changing diapers and bathing a child are not as impor-
tant as [loving], being there, laughing, or educating a child."69
These elements are not dependent on physical ability. Indeed,
one could argue that parents with disabilities are better suited
" Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 328.
67 162 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Ct. App. 1980).
" Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
69 More Love To Give Than Anyone: Excerpts from the Testimony of Melissa
Walstead, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 9 [hereinafter More Love
To Give].
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than their able-bodied counterparts to help children "broaden[ ]
their perspective on issues of independence, relationships,
commitment, problem-solving, life value, diversity, and flexibil-
ity."70 As one co-worker told a disabled mother, "[y]our kids
are so terrific. You really did a good job.... And I think that's
partially because you work at those other kinds of things that
sometimes people leave out because they are so into the physi-
cal."7 '
Perhaps the best rejoinder to the stereotype of physical
parenting was made by the California Supreme Court during
its reversal of the lower court in Carney, which is worth quot-
ing at length:
[T]he stereotype is false because it fails to reach the heart of the
parent-child relationship. Contemporary psychology confirms what
wise families have perhaps always known-that the essence of
parenting is not to be found in the harried rounds of daily
carpooling endemic to modern suburban life, or even in the doggedly
dutiful acts of "togetherness" committed every weekend by well-
meaning fathers and mothers across America. Rather, its essence
lies in the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance the parent
gives to the child throughout his formative years, and often beyond.
The source of this guidance is the adult's own experience of life; its
motive power is parental love and concern for the child's well-being;
and its teachings deal with such fundamental matters as the child's
feelings about himself, his relationships with others, his system of
values, his standards of conduct, and his goals and priorities in
life.... [I-]owever limited his bodily strength may be, a handi-
capped parent is a whole person to the child who needs his affection,
sympathy, and wisdom to deal with the problems of growing up.72
'o See Prejudice, Plain and Simple: Excerpts from the Testimony of Carol Gill,
DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 8, 8-9.
71 ROUSSO, supra note 28, at 128.
72 Carney, 598 P.2d at 44; see also Warnick v. Couey, 359 So. 2d 801, 803
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978) ("Just as clear is the fact that while the husband's physical
condition has greatly changed, his love and ability to care for the child has not
changed."); In re Marriage of Levin, 162 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(In determining what is in the best interests of a child "the court must consider
the fact that the essence of parenting is ethical, emotional, and intellectual guid-
ance of the child-something which, by and large, is generally unrelated to the
physical handicap of a parent."); In re Eugene W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740-41 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972) ("It requires no detailed discussion to demonstrate that the support
and, even more, the control of the child is primarily a mental fuction ... ").
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II. A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE TIFFANY CALLO STORY
A Mother's Touch is a compassionate and absorbing ac-
count of disabled mother Tiffany Callo's struggle to regain
custody of her two able-bodied children after they were re-
moved from her care by the Santa Clara County Department of
Social Services ("DSS"). The central question addressed in A
Mother's Touch is whether it was "fair and legal for a society to
tell some of its members that they could not look forward to
raising children because they were disabled." 3 Mathews rais-
es this issue by chronicling Callo's life from the time of her
own childhood through the court hearings that determined her
sons' custody.
A Mother's Touch recounts Callo's personal history in great
detail. It tells the story of how Callo's parents met, conceived
her, discovered that Callo had been born with cerebral palsy,
and dissolved their marriage. The book then follows Callo as
she was raised at various times by her grandmother-with
whom she had a very close and loving relationship-and by her
emotionally erratic father and a succession of stepmothers, one
of whom viciously beat her.74 Callo was permanently removed
from her father's custody and placed into foster care because
she did not explain the origin of her physical abuse when dis-
covered by DSS. 5 One of the foster families with whom Callo
lived had an especially positive impact upon her because "she
found irresistible" their "love and compassion and ease with all
the intricacies of family life."7 6
At age sixteen Callo tried living in a group home for dis-
abled young adults, but was raped by the director's fianc=6 and
another staff member. The director refused to believe that
Callo had been coerced, "despite her obvious inability to fend
off such an attack."77 Thus, legal action did not occur "for a
long time," during which Callo realized that she was pregnant
and later miscarried."3 As a result of her group home experi-
ence, Callo. "resumed living with foster families, . . . clung to
"' MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 177.
71 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 48-51.
75 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 51-57.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 58-59.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60.
71 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60.
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their order and warmth," and "thought often about how to bal-
ance her need for both security and independence."79
Despite-or perhaps because of-her lack of a stable famil-
ial history, at age eighteen Callo "began to think about what
kind of a family she was going to make for herself."80 Shortly
afterwards she fell in love with Tony, a disabled thirty-three-
year-old former gang member. Combining their disability pay-
ments, they were able to rent a small apartment and began
living together. Callo soon discovered that she was pregnant.
The thought was particularly exciting because of Callo's convic-
tion that she would be a good mother:
She appreciated the small moments of a relationship with a child, of
what she had had with her grandmother-the looks and the prom-
ises and the long, soft conversations. God had denied her many
things, but He had given her an appreciation of stability and consis-
tency and the wise use of the 86,400 seconds in every day. She could
take life slowly, with none of the guilt of the young executives she
saw charging up Santa Clara Street with their dress-for-success
suits and their thin briefcases. Her baby would get a lot of her
time.
8'
Callo's pregnancy broke new ground for many of the peo-
ple around her. Neither the nurse whom DSS sent each month
to check on Callo, nor any of the health care providers at her
local hospital had any experience with pregnant women with
disabilities. The able-bodied women in Callo's childbirth class
often treated her "like a piece of furniture." 2 Callo's pregnan-
cy also engendered hostile responses. One woman who ap-
proached her on the street said, "I don't think it's right, a per-
son like you having a baby." 3
Mathews relates how DSS's response to the birth of Callo's
first son David at the local hospital combined ignorance with
prejudice. Because of DSS orders, David was bottle-fed against
his own mother's express wishes and Callo wasn't allowed to
see or hold her child for the first fourteen hours of his life.
Although Callo had prepared for weeks for her post-partum
experience, thinking through how she would care for her child,
7' MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60.
9 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 76.
82 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 80.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 81.
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she was told, almost immediately after birth by a county social
worker, "If you don't cooperate with us, you may never see
your son again."'
While still in the hospital, Callo was questioned by Daryl
E. Auten, a juvenile court officer, who later conducted an in-
trusive inspection of Callo's home. Although Callo pleaded with
Auten--'Tll go to classes.... You tell me whatever is neces-
sary.... I want my kid at home,"-DSS never provided Callo
with instruction or any other form of assistance in caring for
her child and, therefore, she often was left to her own devic-
es.85 For example, because the nurse DSS sent to inspect
Callo's child rearing abilities was unfamiliar with cribs for
disabled parents, a friend of Callo's engineered a hinge that
allowed her to easily reach David by pulling back one side of
the crib.
David was consigned to the custody of Callo's father and
his new girlfriend, until Tony's sister Irene and her two chil-
dren moved in with the couple. As an additional condition to
Callo regaining some custody of her son, she signed a state-
ment authorizing Irene to keep David with her at all times,
even when Irene left Callo's apartment. The living arrange-
ment was short-lived: Callo was forced to flee Tony's physical
and emotional abuse-once again pregnant and now
alone-and Irene turned David Callo over to DSS.
DSS was less than sympathetic to Callo's plight. The as-
signed caseworker, Shirley Silvani, "doubted from the start"
that Callo could care for David, and before even meeting Callo,
Silvani noted in her log entries that Callo "'cannot provide any
care.., or even hold the baby."'8 6 In addition, although
Silvani had no experience with disabled parents, she rejected
out of hand Callo's assertions that David was both aware of,
and developmentally capable of responding to, the physical
limitations caused by her disability.
Moreover, when Silvani scheduled visitations for Callo
with David it was in the DSS auditorium, a location referred to
by DSS's own caseworkers as the "Zoo" because of the noise
and confusion. Although Silvani explained in her notes that
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 87.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 92.
86 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 110.
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the venue was most convenient for Callo because it was acces-
sible to a person using a motorized wheelchair, Silvani made
no account of the noise and confusion. Instead, she related only
that "'[t]he baby gets very frightened"' during visits and there-
fore "'does not have any meaningful interaction with
As the result of her conclusions, Silvani counseled Callo to
give up David for adoption. After discovering Callo's new preg-
nancy a few weeks later, Silvani advised her to consider an
abortion. When Callo refused both suggestions, DSS filed a
petition to remove David from his mother's custody. The family
court judge appointed an attorney, Clay Bedford, to assist
Callo. Bedford promptly began a media campaign on Callo's
behalf that continued through the birth and removal of her
second son, Jesse.
The media-television in particular-found "irresistible"
the story of how a "county government had taken a baby away
from a bright and beautiful young woman.",8 As they crowded
around her in the maternity ward, Callo succinctly summed up
the origin of her woes: "'If I wasn't handicapped, they would
not dare to take any of my babies away."'8 9 Bedford held a
similar view of the issues that truly underlaid Callo's situa-
tion:
It appalled him that DSS, like nearly every other child-protec-
tive agency in the country, paid more than five hundred dollars a
month to keep a single child in a foster home but could not spend
that same amount on an attendant to help a disabled mother raise
her child in her own home. It offended him that [Callo] was in court
only because her children were healthy and nondisabled. If they had
been born disabled, they would have immediately qualified for atten-
dant care and could have been raised by [Callo]. Of course, if they
had been disabled, probably no one but their mother would have
wanted them anyway.'
During Bedford's engineered media blitz, and prior to the
court hearing that would determine custody of Callo's sons,
Silvani asked psychologist Megan Kirshbaum to conduct an
evaluation of Callo. Kirshbaum, founder of a nonprofit agency
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 110-11.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 11.
89 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 11.
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 22.
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called Through the Looking Glass, is one of the country's lead-
ing authorities on disabled parents and an authority on devel-
oping adaptive parenting devices.' She also is married to a
disabled person and is the mother of a child with a congenital
disability.
Kirshbaum's evaluation took Callo's physical limitations in
stride. For example, although Callo required more time than
an able-bodied mother to accomplish parental tasks--changing
diapers might take up to twenty minutes-Kirshbaum recog-
nized that Callo's speaking and cooing to David during diaper-
ing were "bridging techniques" that both calmed and reassured
him." Instead of being a detrimental activity because of the
time involved, the instinctive bridging techniques made for a
pleasant experience. David became patient, adapting his be-
havior in response to his mother's disability. In addition, con-
trary to Silvani's observation that David feared his mother,
Kirshbaum discovered that it was the strangeness and eleva-
tion of Callo's motorized wheelchair that had initially made the
child uncomfortable. To counter the effect, Kirshbaum sat
Callo on the floor opposite David who, now excited, played ball
with his mother. To test her theory, Kirshbaum sat Silvani,
with whom David was familiar, in Callo's wheelchair. When
David was handed to Silvani, he cried.
A Mother's Touch chronicles Callo's court battles to regain
custody of her children and to reveal where and with whom
David and Jesse Callo were assigned to live. The book also
tells the story of how Callo finally found a gentle and loving
partner. The real strengths of A Mother's Touch are Mathews's
skills as a writer and his sympathetic viewpoint, which help
make Callo's story even more engaging. Mathews also is tender
in his portrayal of Callo as a mother, detailing with compas-
sion the interactions between mother and children during their
frequently interrupted time together.
If there is a notable shortfall to A Mother's Touch, it is
that Mathews's use of interweaving flashbacks often confuse
the chronology of events. A distaste for such artifice may, how-
ever, be no more than this lawyer's bias for first understanding
and then telling stories in linear fashion with succeeding be-
MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 146.
92 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 201.
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ginnings, middles and ends. Nevertheless, Mathews's style is
bright and vibrant and the story he tells is both relevant and
compelling.
III. THE NEED FOR A DEFINABLE LEGAL STANDARD
A Mother's Touch is an important book that raises ques-
tions about mainstream society's understanding and treatment
of parenting by people with disabilities. Tiffany Callo's story,
together with the views reflected in the lower court decisions
in Carney, Richardson, and Levin,93 forces several issues to be
addressed. When called upon to determine a child's custody,
courts traditionally base their decisions upon what they consid-
er to be "the best interests of the child."' This determination
of "best interest" is arrived at through the balancing of many
factors, including the potential custodial parent's ability to
emotionally and financially support the child. When, however,
one of the parents-or potential parents in the case of adop-
tion-is physically disabled, there is a question of how heavily
a parent's disability should weigh in determining the best
interests of the child. Should disability act as a total bar to
parenthood or, instead, should the physical abilities of the
putative custodian count as only one factor among several that
may be considered in custody decisions? Most importantly, if
physical ability is to be considered, what weight should it carry
and how are the rights of disabled parents to be protected?
A definable legal standard for determining the weight
given to physical disability in custodial decisionmaking is nec-
essary. Currently, physical disability is a statutory ground for
termination of parental rights in three states.95 California,
See supra text accompanying notes 47-72.
See generally AREEN, supra note 47, at 428; Jonathan A. Weiss, The Emerg-
ing Rights of Minors, 4 U. TOL. L. REV. 25, 26-36 (1972). Only a handful of cases
have applied a "best interests" analysis in the context of disabled parents. See,
e.g., Rains v. Alston, 576 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Ark. 1979) (en banc) ("The most impor-
tant matter to be considered by any court in matters of this nature is the best in-
terest of the infant child."); In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742, 744 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)
("The paramount consideration in this type of proceeding is the best interests of
the child."); Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981) ("the physical condition
of a parent is a valid consideration in a 'best interests' approach").
" See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-920(c)(2) (Michie 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-
609(3) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(B) (Anderson 1976). Similar pro-
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birthplace of the Carney, Richardson, and Levin decisions, re-
pealed a child custody statute containing language that would
have protected disabled parents' rights. 6 Professor Laura
Rothstein has suggested that "in all cases.., the standard
should be to determine the best interests of the child, with the
handicap of parents being only a factor for consideration, rath-
er than as establishing any kind of presumption of unfit-
ness."
97
Professor Rothstein's standard is similar to that of the
Model Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,98 which has been
adopted by a handful of states.9 A standard along the lines of
the Rothstein/Model Act standard should be adopted, but with
one very strong qualification: When courts weigh "the handicap
of parents" as a "factor for consideration," they must appreciate
that certain parental tasks performed by the physically dis-
abled in ways different from those mainstream society consid-
ers "normal," may nevertheless constitute an equally valid
performance of those tasks. Binding courts with a clear stan-
dard will require individual judges to (presumably) enunciate
visions have been repealed in Maryland and Wyoming.
"6 See CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 300(a) (Deering 1985) ("No parent shall
be found to be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care or control
solely because of a physical disability.") (repealed 1987). Likewise, Governor
Deukmejian vetoed a California State Senate Bill that would have placed disabled
parents on equal ground with their able-bodied counterparts. MATHEWS, supra note
1, at 238-40. In 1989, the California State Legislature passed a vaguely worded
bill, AB558, which may or may not provide the type of assistance Callo sought. Id.
at 242. The current version of California's child custody statute, CAL. WELFARE &
INST. CODE § 300(j) (Deering 1993), contains the following language:
[A] physical disability, such as blindness or deafness, is no bar to the raising
of happy and well-adjusted children and that a court's determination pursuant
to this section shall center upon whether a parent's disability prevents him or
her from exercising care and control.
'7 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 186.
" Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that the
following factors be balanced in determining custody decisions: "(1) the wishes of
the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to
his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent
or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved." UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1992).
" As of this writing, those states include Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana and Washington. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1992).
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the weight they give to the various factors so that, at the very
least, a record may be established to contest their rulings.0 0
Although not yet challenged in court, such a qualification
may well be required from a legal perspective under equal
protection, procedural due process, and ADA analyses. For
instance, under an equal protection analysis, a court strictly
scrutinizes state action when the action impacts upon a sus-
pect class of people, or when the state action affects a funda-
mental right. Although people with disabilities currently are
not considered a suspect class,'0 ' the rights of procreation
and parenting repeatedly have been recognized as fundamen-
tal.'0 2 Therefore, procreative and parental rights of disabled
people probably would be upheld under strict scrutiny. Addi-
tionally, procedural due process requires that a fair adjudica-
tive procedure be afforded to individuals prior to depriving
them of life, liberty or property. Judging people with disabili-
ties by able-bodied standards is hardly equitable, and thus an
invalid process.' 3 Finally, Title II of the ADA prohibits pub-
lic entities from excluding disabled people from participation in
their various benefits and services.' 4 While not yet inter-
preted by any reported decisions in this specific context, Title
II conceivably will prevent social service agencies from shun-
ning disabled parents because of their special needs.
10 I have used the term "presumably" in deference to the continuing debate
among legal scholars over whether judges are knowingly capable of or willing to
state their true reasons for reaching any given decision. Compare Scott Altman,
Beyond Candor, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 296 (1990) with David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). My view on this matter is opti-
mistically fatalistic: I believe in the general integrity of our judges; nevertheless,
judges who wish to conceal their true motives always will be able to do so.
01 See Marcia P. Burgdorf & Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a 'Suspect Class" Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 855 (1975) (positing that the
disabled should be regarded as a suspect class). I find most of the Burgdorfs'
analysis to be persuasive.
0 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
103 Judge Devine observed in another context, "[aissessing the capability of vari-
ous individuals to perform . .. without an individualized determination of their
strengths and weaknesses would appear to be impossible." Garrity v. Gallen, 522
F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981).
"o Title II provides, in pertinent part, that "no qualified individual with a dis-
ability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by such an entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. II 1990).
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Qualifying the standard by which disabled parents' disabil-
ities are evaluated by accepting different physical methodology,
certainly is crucial from a social perspective because
"[t]ypically, the differences that cultures outside of the domi-
nant culture present have been thought of as deficiencies."" 5
As Professor Martha Minow has persuasively and eloquently
demonstrated, "'[difference' is only meaningful as a compari-
son."' To be different requires first that there be an estab-
lished and known norm from which one can differ, for it is
impossible to be out of the mainstream unless a mainstream
exists. Professor Minow writes that the
treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point
of comparison: women are compared to the unstated norm of men,
"minority" races to whites, handicapped persons to the able-bod-
ied.... Difference may seem salient not because of a trait intrinsic
to the person but instead because the dominant institutional ar-
rangements were designed without the trait in mind. Consider the
difference between buildings built without considering the needs of
people in wheelchairs and buildings that are accessible to people in
wheelchairs."7
In the context of parenting, the disabled non-sexuality
myth ' leads society to envision its children raised by able-
bodied people. Parents with physical disabilities exist outside
the parameters of this norm, if at all. Modifying Professor
Minow's analogy, consider the difference between social service
agency evaluations that judge disabled people by able-bodied
standards-such as applying a Rorschach test to a person with
cerebral palsy who may have perceptual difficulties'° 9-and
social service agency evaluations like those performed by
" Susan O'Connor, Culture, Disability and Family Policy, 2 CTR. ON HUM.
POLeY BuLL. 4, 4-5 (1992).
" Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 13 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered].
Many of my thoughts in this section are drawn from Martha Minow's fine writings
on legal sensitivity to difference, and are indebted to her insight. See MARTHA
MINOW, THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE (1991); Martha Minow, All in the Family &
In All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275 (1992)
[hereinafter Minow, All in the Family]; Martha Minow, Redefining Families-Who's
In and Who's Out, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991) [hereinafter Minow, Redefining
Families].
"o Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 106, at 13-14.
"o See supra text accompanying notes 17-43.
109 See MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 180-81.
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Megan Kirshbaum, which adapt "normal" techniques to the
needs of the disabled-for example, seating a wheelchair-using
parent on the floor so that she can communicate on an equal
plane with her child."' Consider also the difference between
treating as normal an increasingly common parenting practice
ih which children of able-bodied parents are raised almost
exclusively by nannies, while treating as inadequate an emo-
tionally close and loving parenting relationship in which cer-
tain physical tasks, such as food preparation, are performed by
an individual assisting disabled parents.
Tiffany Callo's physical differences meant spending more
time in performing parental tasks such as changing her
children's diapers. She facilitated the task by using velcro
fastenings instead of safety pins."' For other disabled par-
ents physical difference takes on other manifestations. Dorothy
Wainer, who walks with a pronounced limp as the result of
childhood polio, utilizes "every single device in terms of trans-
portation" to maintain her balance, including strollers, snugli
carriers,"' sassy seats,"' backpacks and a cane." Carol
Ann Roberson, a post-polio quadriplegic who could hold neither
her children nor a book, learned to read upside down so that
she could read to her children while they sat in front of her
holding their books facing them.'15 Cathy Cates, who is bal-
anced-impaired, learned to improvise her ambulation tech-
niques in order to carry her baby. Indoors, Cates used a stroll-
er and leaned on walls. Outside, Cates used child carriers with
front and back straps and trained herself to use one crutch
instead of two so that she would have a free hand to carry both
purse and diaper bag."6
Even with the accomplishment of parental tasks through
different techniques, mothers with disabilities fear that main-
11o MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 137-49.
. MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 194, 215.
112 A "snugli carrier" is a pouch that straps around a person's neck and back so
that a young child can sit against his or her parent's chest while leaving the
parent's arms free.
113 A "sassy seat" latches onto a table, making it easier to feed a baby if a
parent has weak upper extremities.
.. ROUSSO, supra note 28, at 78-79.
11' ROUSSO, supra note 28, at 127-28.




stream society will remove their children because of prevailing
misconceptions. The result is the diminishment of parental joy
for otherwise able and loving parents. Roberson admits that
"[w]hen my kids were younger, I can remember always being
afraid [that] .... someone would possibly take my kids away
from me because the expectation might be that I couldn't do it
alone." 17 Similarly, Cates concedes that "[olne of my biggest
fears has been that my children would be taken away because
some bureaucrats decided that my physical limitations made
me an inadequate parent.""'
Mainstream society is slowly developing a broader recogni-
tion of family and parenthood than the model presented in the
television show "Father Knows Best," which featured a house-
hold headed by a same-race, heterosexual couple raising their
own biological children." 9 It is increasingly common for inter-
racial' or gay couples'2 ' or single parents'22  to raise
117 See ROUSSO, supra note 28, at 127.
," Cates, supra note 116, at 25; see also More Love To Give, supra note 69, at
9 ("If something happened to my husband, would my child be taken away from
me?").
" See generally Elizabeth Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Sta-
tas: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Minow, Redefining Families, supra note 106;
Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: Limits of the Functional Approach to the
Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
120 "In 1992, the U.S. Census reported more than a million interracial marriages
in this country." Lise Funderburg, Looking For a Legacy Beyond Black and White,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1993, at 125; see also LISE FUNDERBURG, BLACK, WHITE,
OTHER: BIRACIAL AMERICANS TALK ABOUT RACE AND RACIAL IDENTITY (1994); Da-
vid Jacobson, Does "Pelican Brief"
. Practice Abstinence for Racial Reasons?,
GANNE"T NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS
File, at *4 ("The number of black-white marriages is growing 'exponentially' ....
There were only 65,000 interracial married couples in 1970 .... But in 1992,
there were almost a quarter million such marriages.") (quoting Carlos Fernandez,
president of the Association of MultiEthnic Americans). My thanks to Scott Geddes
of Mead Data Central for providing me with these citations.
121 See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Rede-
fining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting a
More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91 (1991). But see Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991) (deny-
ing visitation rights to lesbian ex-lover of natural mother) see also Kimberly P.
Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests of the Child
in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1992) (arguing that
courts should determine the best interests of a child by "analyzing the nature of
the relationship between the petitioner and the child").
122 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
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traditionally or openly adopted children" of their own or dif-
ferent races' in "blended," multi-generational, or extended
family arrangements.' Nor should it be uncommon for peo-
ple with disabilities to raise children. The social construct of
being disabled126 is no more removed from the "Father Knows
Best" model than are other social constructs. Many of the ra-
tionales that have been used to argue for parental rights 7 of
these groups apply equally to the disabled.
One example of a parallel rationale is the Supreme Court's
treatment of interracial marriage and step-parentage in
Palmore v. Sidoti."25 Rejecting a divorced white father's claim
to custody based solely on his white ex-wife cohabiting with
and later marrying an African American, the Court reasoned
that:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic preju-
dices do not exist .... There is a risk that a child living with a step-
parent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures
and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the
same racial or ethnic origin.
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases
and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible consider-
ations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it toler-
ate them.'29
Another example is the recognition of homosexual parental
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 18 (1991) (almost one-quarter of all Ameri-
can children live in single-parent households).
See Minow, All in the Family, supra note 106, at 287.
.2. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of
Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991).
1 "[Tihe 'family' is not one entity but a multitude of unique interpersonal
relationships bound by complicated mixtures of biology, culture, love, and depen-
dence, and threatened by complicated internal and external pressures." Martha
Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 933, 989 (1985); see also Minow, All In the Family, supra note 106, at
284-86.
" See generally CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A -SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
(1988); see also NORA E. GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE: HEREDI-
TARY DEAFNESS ON MARTHA'S VINEYARD (1985) (account of nineteenth-century com-
munity comprised mostly of hearing-impaired people).
'L See generally Elizabeth Bartlett, supra note 119; Marsha Garrison, Why
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1983).
1'2 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
129 Id. at 433.
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rights by a New York State court in In re Adoption of
Evan.' The Evan court explained that:
this is not a matter which arises in a vacuum. Social fragmentation
and the myriad configurations of modern families have presented us
with new problems and complexities that cannot be solved by ideal-
izing the past. Today a child who .... receives the love and nurture
of even a single parent can be counted among the blessed. 1'
By recognizing the equality of physical difference in performing
parenting tasks, either of the above quotations can be re-read
with the disabled in mind.
The recognition of difference for disabled parents currently
is under attack in a case involving a Michigan couple.'32 Bill
Earl and Leigh Campbell Earl, a married couple with cerebral
palsy, are engaged in a fight with the Ingham County Depart-
ment of Social Services over the care of their non-disabled
child Natalie. Current state regulations provide that personal
care assistants hired to care for disabled people may not touch
their clients' children during paid working hours. Without
assistance from their attendant, the Earls cannot attend to all
of Natalie's physical needs and may lose custody of their
daughter.
The Earls' plight garnered enough attention to warrant a
joint hearing of the Michigan legislature, at which many dis-
ability rights advocates testified.'33 One of those witnesses
130 153 Misc.2d 844, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1992).
131 Id. at 852, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. Professor Sylvia Law wrote the report
upon which the court based its findings. See id. at 845, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
" The discussion that follows is drawn from the May/June 1993 issue of the
Disability Rag ReSource, which featured the topic "Parenting With a Disability."
"' Among those testifying were Barbara Faye Waxman, Carol Gill, Cecily Cagle
and Alan Bergman. Bergman noted that while "home maintenance and minor re-
pairs, yard work" were allowable activities for personal health care attendants,
child care was not. See Yard Work, Yes. Child Care, No: Excerpts from the Testi-
mony of Alan Bergman, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 7-8.
Bergman's point has wider and more ironic implications. In an effort to keep chil-
dren with their (non-disabled) parents, social service agencies often are required by
state statute to provide drug and alcohol rehabilitation, job training and housing
placements, see, e.g., In re Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368, 385, 462 N.E.2d 1139, 1147,
474 N.Y.S.2d 421, 430-32 (1984); In re Gyvon Lamar P., 190 A.D.2d 592, 593
N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1993); In re Custody of Courtney L., 188
A.D.2d 265,590 N.Y.S.2d 456 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1992) (Michael A. Stein and
Barbara H. Dildine on the briefs for the respective children), yet nothing specifical-
ly requires these agencies to undertake similar efforts at maintaining disabled
parent/non-disabled children family arrangements. For a scathing analysis of one
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was Tiffany Callo. Addressing the joint houses, Callo asked:
How many of you legislators are parents? How would you like
it if someone legally kidnapped your little boy or little girl? Would
you miss them? It's the same with us. We have the same needs to
have children, but not the same rights to keep them.... [Wihy
should parents with disabilities still be discriminated against in our
basic rights to be parents?134
Just as she did in A Mother's Touch, Callo continues to raise
some serious, unanswered questions.
state's termination procedures, see Jonathan Weiss & Oscar Chase, The Case for
Repeal of Section 383 of the New York Social Services Law, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 325 (1972).
' 'Unfit" Because of My Disability: Excerpts from the Testimony of Tiffany
Calo Brazil, DISABiLrrY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 9.
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